This paper studies how credit constraints develop over bank relationships. I analyze a unique dataset of matched loan application and loan contract information and measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts. I find that the most important determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts are firm age and size at the time of the first interaction between borrower and bank. Over loan sequences, credit constraints decease most pronouncedly in the beginning of relationships and for the initially young and small firms. Moreover, the structure of the dataset allows me to disentangle the demand and supply effects behind these observed credit constraints. I find that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases because both sides converge. If previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately, while granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. The findings are a sign of the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information problems when contracting repeatedly with opaque borrowers. The results further suggest that, particularly in the beginning of a bank relationship, borrowers learn from their previous experience with credit constraints and adjust their demand accordingly.
Introduction
The nature of a bank-borrower relationship may be characterized as a "mutual commitment" (Boot and Marinc (2008) ). Yet, while the literature has shown that banks collect and process a variety of (proprietary) information and how this may reduce credit constraints, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the evolution of borrowers' demand for credit and its interaction with banks' supply of credit over bank relationships. This paper makes a first step to address this interaction by investigating how requested and granted loan amounts evolve over bank relationships and how they are influenced by previous contractual outcomes in a sequence of loans.
I employ a unique dataset of matched loan applications and loan contracts that includes both requested and granted loan terms as well as borrower and relationship characteristics at the time of loan origination. The dataset consists of nearly 99,000 loans to small enterprises extended by one bank in Bulgaria over the period April 2003 to September 2007. As most of these small loans are of comparatively short maturities I am able to follow loan sequences with up to nine loans within the observation period. Analyzing chains of short-term repeat loans complements studies that focus on credit lines to assess how banks use the information they gather from multiple interactions with their borrowers (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) and Norden and Weber (2010) ).
Exploiting the structure of my dataset, I measure credit constraints as the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts and investigate not only how this ratio relates to firm characteristics but also how it evolves over sequential loan contracts. Previous papers point out that both demand and supply side factors determine credit availability and loan terms (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Qian and Strahan (2007) ). In a second step, I therefore study requested and granted loan amounts separately to gain deeper insights into the dynamic processes on both the demand and supply side and to determine the borrower's and the bank's reactions to the degree of credit constraints at the previous loan. The dynamic patterns of requested and granted loan amounts that arise when borrowers contract repeatedly with the same lender have not yet been comprehensively established.
The results show that borrowers are considerably credit constrained in the outset of their bank relationships. The most important determinants of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts are firm age and size at the time of the first interaction between borrower and bank.
This indicates that the extent of (publicly) available information matters for initial differences in credit constraints between borrowers. Apart from that, a reduction in information asymmetries resulting from repeated interactions crucially determines credit constraints. I find that observed credit constraints decrease over loan sequences with this effect being most distinct in the beginning of the relationship. This finding provides a first indication of the evolution of borrowers' requests over multiple interactions with the same lender. It rules out that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to previous constraints because this would not induce the observed reduction in credit constraints. I also find that the decrease in observed credit constraints over time is especially pronounced for the initially young and small firms. This is a sign for the use of dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information problems when contracting repeatedly with small and opaque borrowers.
Further disentangling demand from supply effects reveals that observed credit constraints decrease over a loan sequence due to a convergence of the demand and supply sides. While both borrowers' requested and the bank's granted loan amounts rise over time, they differ in their reaction to previous credit constraints. When the extent of previous credit constraints is large in the beginning of the relationship, requested amounts increase more moderately whereas granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. These findings imply that borrowers learn from previous experiences. If the feedback they get from an interaction is negative, i.e. if they receive a smaller than requested loan amount, they adjust their request at the subsequent interaction accordingly to avoid being highly constrained again. At the same time, the results confirm that the bank uses dynamic incentives to overcome information problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due repayment when contracting repeatedly. This is in line with arguments that bank relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect and assess information in due course and benefit borrowers by better loan terms over time.
My approach differs from earlier papers on the credit availability of small firms in two important ways. First, in contrast to previous studies relying on indirect (e.g. Rajan (1994, 1995) ) or equilibrium outcome (e.g. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ) proxies of credit availability it provides a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints because it incorporates loan demand. Secondly, while studies analyzing the influence of relationship and firm characteristics on the likelihood of being denied credit do consider loan applications they deal with borrower rationing (e.g. Cole (1998) ). My study, on the contrary, is concerned with loan size constraints for those borrowers who receive credit. 1 1 Keeton (1979) distinguishes between these two forms of credit constraints. If information is distributed asymmetrically, banks may ration borrowers (type I constraints) to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard which would negatively impact their profit (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ). Jaffee and Russell (1976) derive that granting lower than requested loan amounts (type II constraints) may serve as a sorting device because
The main contribution of this paper consists in providing first evidence on the dynamic patterns that arise when bank and borrower interact repeatedly by disentangling demand and supply effects behind observed credit constraints. Thereby, it amends existing findings on the supply side (see Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ) and adds to the very recently emerging literature that aims at distinguishing between demand and supply effects in bank lending (Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2009) , Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) , Cheng and Degryse (2010) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010) ).
Finally, the panel structure of the employed dataset makes it possible to add to the existing literature on bank relationships from a methodological point of view by addressing the fact that borrowers non-randomly drop out of the sample. I empirically model this attrition process in a two-stage procedure that accounts for sample selection at each interaction between borrowers and bank. Cross-sectional studies may not be fully able to control for potential changes in the composition of the pool of borrowers over time (see also Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) . I find that the extent of credit constraints does not seem to matter for selection, i.e. the probability to take out another loan. While the analysis reveals that there is an attrition bias in the data, the main results are robust to explicitly accounting for the attrition process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 provides institutional details on the loan granting process and describes the data while section 4 presents the findings from the empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes.
Literature overview

The evolution of requested and granted loan amounts over multiple interactions
Theories of financial intermediation constitute that banks are able to accumulate extensive private information about their borrowers through screening and monitoring (Diamond (1984) , Ramakrishan and Thakor (1984) , Fama (1985) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) ). Especially relationship lending, i.e. multiple interactions with the same borrower over time (Boot (2000) ), seems well suited to provide banks with (proprietary) information on their customers. Multiple interactions with the same borrower leave room for the bank to set dynamic incentives to deal with agency problems in an environment with asymmetric borrowers with a utility increase from defaulting are discouraged from borrowing as their benefits (i.e. larger loan sizes) decrease.
information. In the model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) financial constraints arise endogenously as an enforcement device to ensure repayment because the credible threat to terminate funding discourages borrowers from diverting funds. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005) extend this model and show that the effect of dynamic incentives may be reinforced by providing increased funding upon due repayment. Furthermore, the gametheoretic structure of the two-period model in Egli (2004) explains that reputation acquisition is essential for borrowers to sustain the relationship with the bank in order to obtain further funding in the future. Expanding on this argument, Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006) highlight that relationship financing allows borrowers to benefit from better loan terms if strategic default is easy, e.g. in countries with weak accounting and judicial standards. The reason is that lenders who finance several projects up-front have to charge very high interest rates to be compensated for the risk of strategic default. Finally, Martinelli (1997) provides a rationale for the specific value of dynamic incentives in bank lending to very young firms that have not yet established a credit history or reputation.
Summarizing, dynamic incentives provide a way to test a borrower's repayment ability and willingness with small loan amounts in the beginning of the relationship. Loan amounts then gradually increase upon positive repayment behavior so that setting dynamic incentives serves as an enforcement device and enables the bank to closely monitor the borrower in early stages of the relationship.
2 Therefore, I expect granted loan amounts to increase over repeated interactions between borrowers and bank. Besides, the increase is expected to be more pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers such as young firms.
Models dealing with the borrower side in bank-borrower relationships mainly concentrate on the costs (Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004) ) and benefits (Boot and Thakor (1994) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and von Thadden (1995)) borrowers incur from multiple interactions with the same lender. However, multiple interactions between borrower and bank may be interpreted as a strategic game in which both actors have to learn about the game and the other player. Requested (and granted) loan amounts therefore possibly depend on previous outcomes of loan contracting.
Considering borrowers' behavior, two scenarios seem possible when borrowers approach the bank for the first time, request a certain loan amount and are granted only a lower than requested amount after the financial analysis. On the one hand, borrowers may learn which projects the bank will possibly finance and which loan amounts to request when applying for further loans. Such an adaptation of requested loan amounts should reduce observed credit constraints over loan sequences. Besides, it implies that borrowers who were granted a considerably lower than requested amount at the previous interaction should place a more moderate request at the next interaction compared to borrowers who received the amount they requested. The literature on borrower behavior in the credit market is scarce. For instance, Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2008) model and test learning dynamics in a credit card market where clients seem to learn to avoid paying future fees through negative feedback, i.e. the experience of past fees.
On the other hand, it seems plausible to assume that borrowers who received a lower than requested loan amount at the previous interaction may react by overstating the requested amount for the next loan accordingly. This implies that observed credit constraints would persist, especially in the beginning of a bank relationship, although granted loan amounts per se may increase. A parallel argument can be found in papers that investigate overbidding in the fixed-interest repo auctions the European Central Bank (ECB) used to conduct. 3 Based on the stylized repo game model of Nautz and Oechssler (2003) , Ehrhart (2001) shows in an experimental study that bid sizes as well as the extent of overbidding increase over time when the planned allotment is smaller than bidders' true demand. Bidders are found to follow a myopic best-reply behavior, i.e. for the current bid they take into account the ratio of their true demand to their individual allotment at their previous bid. Nautz and Oechssler (2006) confirm these experimental findings analyzing data from the ECB and the Bundesbank. 
Related empirical studies
This study contributes to three strands of the empirical banking and finance literature:
relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending and the determinants of credit availability for small firms.
Empirical studies on relationship lending have used a variety of proxies such as the length, number, scale and scope of bank relationships to capture the intensity of the relationship and the extent of asymmetric information. Yet, it is not clear from this approach how exactly banks collect and process information. One possibility for banks to gather information over time is to observe their borrowers' usage of credit lines (Berger and Udell (1995) ). While Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) examine the determinants of credit line usage, Norden and Weber (2010) find that banks indeed use the information gained from observing borrowers' credit line usage and account activity in managing their relationships.
For instance, if banks receive early warning signals from limit violations, they increase credit spreads on subsequent loans made to these borrowers. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) confirm that observing the usage of credit lines provides banks with the most valuable private information.
This study complements the literature on information production in bank relationships by analyzing a chain of short-term repeat loans as another possibility for banks to gather information from multiple interactions with the same customer. Following bank and borrowers from their first interaction over several loan contracts allows me to explore how banks make use of dynamic incentives to deal with risks arising from asymmetric information and how this learning process translates into granted loan terms.
Very few recent papers examine demand and supply effects in bank lending. Cheng and Degryse (2010) find that the introduction of a public credit registry alleviates informational barriers and reduces credit rationing in the Chinese credit card market when studying demand and supply separately. Focusing on the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks on bank lending, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010) study how the balance-sheet strengths of Spanish banks and firms influence credit availability thus separating demand and supply effects on the probability that a loan request results in a loan granted. Concerning their relationship measures, they observe that longer and fewer bank relationships positively influence credit availability. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) examine how the US financial crisis affected retail bank lending at German savings banks. They find that demand decreases at all savings banks while savings banks that were affected by the financial crisis reject substantially more loan applications than non-affected banks. They also find that loan applications of customers with previous relationships with an affected bank are less likely to be rejected than those of new customers.
This paper extends the existing evidence on demand and supply effects in bank lending by explicitly exploiting a panel data structure and analyzing requested and granted loan amounts in a sequence of interactions between borrowers and a bank. It is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study to provide evidence of the dynamic patterns that arise on both the demand and the supply side when bank and borrowers contract repeatedly over time. In that respect, it is closest to Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) . Using a panel dataset, they follow borrowers over several interactions with lenders and study contracted loan terms before and after borrowers switch banks. Thereby they are able to establish the dynamic patterns that arise on the supply side when firms start new relationships and interact repeatedly with one lender. This paper adds the demand side to the analysis. So far, the literature has been relatively silent on how exactly loan negotiations work 5 and how bank and borrower react to previous contractual outcomes.
Finally, this study relates to the literature on the influence of bank relationships on credit availability of small firms. Existing empirical studies generally find a positive relation between various measures of relationship strength and credit availability. Rajan (1994, 1995) use an indirect measure of credit constraints, the percentage of trade credits paid late. They find that the length and scope of the relationship and borrowing from fewer lenders positively influence credit availability. While these papers have established the value of close bank relationships on the availability of credit for small firms, they have not been able to directly observe borrowers' requests and relate them to the actual loan terms granted by the bank. Without this information, it is not clear whether the indirect proxy captures loan size constraints or borrower rationing.
Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find a positive influence of borrowing from fewer lenders on credit availability. Cole (1998) and Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) establish that the valuable private information seems to be gathered very early in the relationship. Machauer and Weber (1998) confirm that close bank relationships are beneficial for firms since they obtain more finance when borrowing from their hausbanks, while Elsas and Krahnen (1998) find that especially risky borrowers benefit from bank relationships. Scott (2006) shows that loan officer turnover, which is connected with a loss of soft information, is positively related to the probability that banks deny credit. Finally, Bodenhorn (2007) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) find that bank relationships play a crucial role in obtaining larger contracted loan amounts.
This paper uses a more comprehensive measure of credit availability: the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts for those borrowers receiving credit. One caveat to this approach, however, is that it assumes requested and granted loan amounts to mirror 'real' demand and supply although both may be driven by strategic considerations. Whereas the dataset at hand does not allow me to fully resolve this issue, it takes the analysis of credit availability one step further by incorporating loan applications and shedding some first light on strategic processes. [Insert Table 1 here]
All observations with missing loan or firm-level data are excluded. Since the following empirical analysis focuses on the evolution of requested and granted loan sizes and their relation over a loan sequence, all loans after the ninth are excluded due to very few observations in these categories. Based on the fact that interest rate and collateral requirements are fixed for small loans whereas they are individually negotiated in the loan granting process for medium loans (loans with amounts of more than 50,000 EUR), eventually all medium loans are excluded from the main analysis. This leads to the final sample of 98,987 loans to 58,642 firms comprising 32,832 single loan clients and 25,810
repeat clients with loan sequences of up to nine loans.
At the heart of the Bank's lending technology is a thorough analysis of the borrower's debt capacity. Approaching the Bank, a borrower first of all meets a Client Advisor who assesses whether the borrower meets the Bank's basic requirements. If the borrower does so, she has to fill in a loan application form. To begin with and most importantly, she is asked to indicate her preferred loan amount, maturity and currency and the purpose of the loan. She also has to provide information about the firm, other bank relations and the amount she can spare monthly for the repayment of the loan. In a next step, the Bank's credit administration prepares information on the borrower's credit history with this Bank and other banks to check her repayment behavior and loyalty to the Bank. At the same time, the loan officer conducts the financial analysis which includes a personal visit to the borrower's site. Eventually, the loan officer presents the customer's request and the suggested loan terms together with the information gathered during the financial analysis to the Bank's credit committee which makes the final decision on the granted loan terms. Collateral requirements and interest rates are fixed and consequently do not play a role in the individual loan contracting process for my sample of small loans (loans with amounts of up to 50,000 EUR). Therefore, I will not explicitly consider these loan terms throughout the empirical analysis.
Concentrating the analysis on small loans from one bank in an emerging market provides an ideal ground for studying the influence of bank relationships on requested and granted loan terms because informational asymmetries are presumably severe. The bank's standardized loan contracts for small loans leave only loan amount (and maturity 6 ) as means for the bank to deal with borrowers' credit risks. The sample is therefore well suited to study the adjustment of these loan terms during the loan granting process. Finally, since the loan granting process is the same for all observed loans possible heterogeneity is reduced at this level.
The ratio of requested to granted loan amounts
Since I observe requested and granted loan amounts I am able to establish the extent to which borrowers receive a smaller loan amount than they requested. I denote this as observed credit constraints and measure it by the Requested-granted ratio (the higher the ratio the more constrained the borrower). Table 2 reveals that the Bank's decision to grant smaller than requested amounts strongly depends on the extent of asymmetric information. To clearly capture the effect of different levels of asymmetric information between borrowers and to separate it from the effect of repeated interactions over time only first loans are included in the calculations. Two proxies for firm opaqueness widely used in the banking literature are firm age (e.g. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001)) and firm size (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) ). I define Initially young firms as those with firm age of up to two years at their first loan because such firms have not had the time to establish a public track record (see Petersen and Rajan (1994) ). To define Initially small firms, I follow Petersen and Rajan (1995) and split the sample at the median value of firm size at the first loan.
Besides, results are presented for the two subsamples of single loan vs. repeat clients to assess whether the extent of observed credit constraints influences the borrower's decision to request a further loan.
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 shows that loan size constraints are significantly larger for the Initially young than for the initially old firms and that this result holds for the single loan and the repeat clients. Findings for the Initially small vs. initially large firms are very similar with differences between the two groups being even more pronounced. Thus, Table 2 clearly indicates that these measures of asymmetric information play an important role in the Bank's decision to grant a lower than requested amount. Interestingly, the difference-in-difference estimates (in bold) show that these differences between the initially young vs. old and initially small vs. large firms are significantly larger for the single loan clients. However, taking a closer look at the single loan vs. repeat clients in the last column of the table reveals that differences in loan size constraints between these groups are economically very small.
Furthermore, it is the group of repeat clients that experiences significantly larger constraints at their first loans if they are initially older or larger. Taken these results together, the extent of observed credit constraints does not seem to (negatively) influence the incidence of borrowing repeatedly from the Bank. Therefore, I will pool all borrowers in the regression analysis.
The main measure of relationship strength is the loan number indicating how many interactions between the borrower and the Bank have taken place providing the Bank with the opportunity to monitor borrowers and to observe their repayment behavior. Figure 1 displays the Requested-granted ratio over the loan sequence for the subsample of repeat clients and its various subgroups based on the age and size indicators of asymmetric information.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Figure 1 shows that observed loan size constraints decrease considerably over an average loan sequence. For the full sample, loan size constraints decrease significantly in the beginning of the loan sequence from 1.24 to 1.07 between the first and the fifth loan. 7 Thus, using this more comprehensive measure of credit constraints confirms findings from previous studies that employ indirect or equilibrium outcome measures for credit availability (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ). The observed decrease in loan size constraints is a first indication of the dynamic patterns that may be at work. On the Bank side, the application of dynamic incentives, which include increasing loan amounts upon due repayment (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005)), lead to a reduction in observed constraints. Alternatively or simultaneously, learning from past experience on the borrower side may explain the observed pattern as well. An explanation which can be ruled out from these results is that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to past constraints because such a behavior would not decrease the ratio between observed requested and granted amounts during the first few interactions.
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that all subgroups of firms experience considerable reductions in loan size constraints in the beginning of their bank relationships. This decrease is significant and particularly strong between the first two loans for the Initially young (from 1.32 to 1.15) and Initially small firms (from 1.31 to 1.16). Apart from that, the Initially young firms which have no or little proof of their viability available at that stage face significantly higher loan size constraints than the older firms in the beginning of their relationships which is consistent with the rationale provided by Martinelli (1997) . Similarly, Initially small firms experience significantly higher credit constraints up to loan number five when comparing them to the initially larger firms. Note that all indicated differences are significant at the 0.01-level using a Student's t-test.
Figure 1 suggests that the information which both Bank and borrowers may gather through repeated interactions reduce observed loan size constraints with this effect being most pronounced for the first few interactions. A crucial part of the following empirical analysis will be concerned with the determinants of loan size constraints and, most importantly, the underlying dynamics on the borrower and Bank side over the course of a bank relationship.
Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts
As a basis for the analysis of dynamic processes on both the demand and supply side, I
start with studying the factors that influence the degree of observed loan size constraints in the sample in two steps. First, I estimate an OLS model for the full sample with Requestedgranted ratio i,k,t as the dependent variable. With larger values indicating higher credit constraints Requested-granted ratio i,k,t is the requested loan amount as a share of the granted loan amount of loan k firm i receives in period t:
A i,t is a vector of indicators measuring the level of asymmetric information, F i,t is a vector that includes firm characteristics controlling for firm risk and capturing further aspects of firm opacity, while L k is a vector of loan characteristics. Finally, B t and T t are vectors of branch and time dummies accounting for the branch-specific (such as local competition) and general (such as macroeconomic and monetary conditions, the Bank's refinancing situation and the Bank's prevailing interest rate and collateral requirements for small loans) environment at the time of loan disbursement.
In a second step, I estimate outcome equation (1) as a panel model with firm fixed effects to control for any unobserved borrower heterogeneity that may have been ignored in the previous analysis and that may influence the Requested-granted ratio. In contrast to the OLS estimator, the fixed effects estimator only accounts for the within variation of all variables, i.e. their variation over a loan sequence for each borrower, and not for their variation between different borrowers. This concentrates the analysis on the factors that determine differences in credit constraints over the course of individual bank-borrower relationships.
Indicators of asymmetric information
The variable Times indicates the number of the current loan and measures the intensity of the bank-borrower relationship. 8 Most importantly, it captures the dynamic patterns that arise along a chain of interactions between borrowers and the Bank. To allow for non-linear effects I include the dummy variables Times_2, …, Times_5 (which pools interactions number five to nine because of the fewer observations in these categories and because the descriptive analysis has displayed that most of the action happens in the beginning of the relationship) and use Times_1 as the reference category.
9 Martinelli (1997) suggests that young firms without a credit history or reputation are initially loan size constrained to provide them with an incentive to repay and obtain larger loan amounts in the future. I include the dummy variable Initially young to capture whether a firm was young, i.e. its firm age was below or equal to two years, when borrowing the first time from the Bank. To study whether dynamic incentives are indeed particularly strong for initially young firms I assess the interaction effects Times_2*Initially young, …, Times_5*Initially young. Similarly, the dummy variable Initially small indicates whether a firm was comparatively small, i.e. its size in terms of total assets was below the median firm size, when borrowing for the first time from the Bank. To assess whether there is indeed a 8 I do not include the duration of a Bank relationship to measure the level of asymmetric information because it is highly correlated with Times. However, rerunning all regressions with Bank relationship instead of Times reveals qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results. 9 I also test for the differences in adjacent time dummies and find that they are significant in all specifications.
differential effect of initial firm size on credit constraints over loan sequences the interaction effects Times_2*Initially small,…, Times_5*Initially small are included.
When a borrower applies for a loan, it is the loan officer with whom interaction takes place and who collects all the borrower-specific data necessary for the subsequent decision on whether to grant a loan and under which conditions (see Berger and Udell (2002) (2009)). If the information gathered by the loan officer cannot fully be transmitted within the bank, which is likely for qualitative soft information, part of it is lost in case a loan officer change takes place. This loss is most extreme when the loan officer leaves the bank but might even matter when responsibilities are rescheduled within the bank. 10 The variable
Loan officer change is included in the analysis indicating whether the loan officer has changed during the duration of the previous loan. If there was a previous change, some of the effects of a close bank-relationship on the reduction of loan size constraints may be tempered.
Firm and loan characteristics
The included firm characteristics are further indicators of asymmetric information and control for borrower risk. Sole proprietorships are more opaque than incorporated firms because they do not have to provide certified annual reports according to Bulgarian law, hence the dummy variable Sole proprietorship equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship and zero otherwise. Borrowers that are highly indebted face a higher risk of default in case of external shocks to their income so that I introduce Leverage, the firm's total debt as share of its total assets at the disbursement date of the loan. A firm with little financial scope (Disposable income (measured in log euro)) to react to unforeseen cuts to its income is more vulnerable to external shocks and thus more risky because the repayment of the loan may be endangered more easily. To account for all remaining differences in firm characteristics the regressions contain seven Industry dummies.
One loan characteristic which raises little concern to be endogenous to the determination of all other loan contract terms is the Fixed capital loan variable. It indicates whether a loan is for fixed capital financing or working capital otherwise, which is induced by the purpose of the loan and thus predetermined (exogenous) to the decision on other loan terms. If a loan is 10 The loan officer changes observed in the dataset mostly occur because loan officers are promoted within the Bank or because they leave the Bank. The Bank does not follow a policy to regularly rotate its loan officers internally to avoid too close relationships between clients and loan officers that might lead to decisions rather based upon personal considerations than objective judgements (see Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2010) for positive effects of loan officer rotation).
intended for fixed capital financing, the underlying asset may be sold in case of default lowering the risk associated with such loans. Similarly, an Annuity loan (dummy variable which is one if the loan is an annuity loan and zero if it is a credit line or overdraft) may be considered less risky because of its regular repayment schedule.
Finally, loan maturity is possibly endogenous to the determination of loan amount and its inclusion in the regressions would bias the estimates. Studying requested and granted loan amounts and maturities reveals that both loan terms are complements because for 67% of all loans they are adjusted into the same direction, i.e. requests for both loan terms are either higher, lower or equal to both granted loan terms. The Spearman rank correlation between the Requested-granted ratio and the ratio of requested to granted maturity is 0.4324 and significant (p-value <0.01) which means that the two variables are not independent.
Therefore, I concentrate the main analysis on requested and granted loan amounts but will provide some further evidence on requested and granted maturities in the extensions.
Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time
When borrowers and Bank interact repeatedly they both learn about the other party's behavior and its reaction to the own behavior which, in turn, may influence the outcome of the following interaction. These dynamic aspects are studied in a panel model with firm fixed effects because the interest lies in the factors affecting changes in requested and granted loan amounts and their relation over borrowers' loan sequences. The dependent variables are
Requested amount i,k,t and Granted amount i,k,t indicating requested and granted loan amounts (in log euro) for loan k that firm i receives in period t:
In this model a i includes the firm fixed effects, A i,t is a vector of indicators of asymmetric information, while F i,t and L k are vectors of firm and loan characteristics. The vector T t contains time dummies accounting for the macroeconomic environment as well as the Bank's prevailing fixed contract terms for small loans at the time of loan disbursement.
Lag Requested-granted ratio, the degree of credit constraints at the previous loan, is the key explanatory variable in these regressions accounting for the effect which the previous experience to receive a smaller than requested loan amount has on current behavior. Annuity loan are expected to be associated with larger granted loan amounts due to their relatively lower credit risk. Again, Requested maturity and Granted maturity are not included because they are complements to requested and granted amount. Bank and borrowers.
Summary statistics
[Insert Table 3 here]
Panel B of Table 3 presents statistics for the two subsamples of unconstrained vs.
constrained loans. Interestingly, column (1) shows that those firms which receive the same as or a larger than requested loan amount exhibit only a slight difference in requested and granted maturities. On the contrary, column (2) shows that firms which are credit constrained are granted equivalently shorter than requested maturities. This is a further indication that loan amount and maturity are complementary contract terms rather than substitutes. The credit constrained firms in column (2) borrow on average less often, are more likely to be young and small at their first loan, are younger in general and have shorter bank relationships than the unconstrained firms (column (1)) so that they seem to be the less experienced borrowers. They are also clearly smaller in terms of total assets and disposable income implying that the Bank may deal with their possibly greater risk by limiting granted loan sizes. A t-test confirms that these differences in firm characteristics are statistically significant at the 0.01-level when comparing the two groups. Interestingly, both groups do not significantly differ in their Asset growth. 
Results
Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts
Effects of asymmetric information indicators and firm and loan variables
Column (1) of Table 4 presents OLS estimates for the full sample. The results confirm that firms with more intense bank relationships and more transparent and less risky firms experience lower observed credit constraints.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The variables Times_2, …, Times_5 capture the effect which the intensity of the bankborrower relationship has on observed loan size constraints for the initially older and larger firms. The more often such a firm borrows from the Bank, the less credit constrained it is with credit constraints decreasing most distinctly between the first two interactions (3.2%). Those firms that are Initially young or Initially small experience credit constraints that are higher than those for the initially older (5.7% on average) or initially larger (5.1% on average) firms. proprietorships which are considered to be less transparent than incorporated firms face lower credit constraints. Nevertheless, the Bank may assess them to be less risky because of their owners' unlimited liability and because the firm management does not easily change.
These results provide information on the criterions that matter for observed credit constraints. While the economic impact of the additional firm characteristics is relatively small, being a young or small firm when starting the bank relationship are important factors of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts. The generally higher constraints for Initially young and Initially small firms indicate that the extent of (publicly) available information between borrowers matters for being credit constrained. Besides, the more pronounced reduction in observed credit constraints over time for the initially young and small firms implies that the positive information from due repayment is especially important for these borrower groups to reduce the Requested-granted ratio over multiple interactions. This complements the findings in Norden and Weber (2010) that the negative information from abnormal credit line usage leads to tighter terms on subsequent loans. In that sense, the Requested-granted ratio may also be interpreted as a measure of the firm's credit worthiness.
Finally, these results rule out that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to previous constraints. Such a dynamic process would not induce the observed reduction in the Requested-granted ratio, especially not its distinct decline between the first and second interactions.
Repeat clients
The results from the repeat client analysis presented in column (2) are very similar to those from the full sample in column (1). Thus, when focusing on borrowers' loan sequences and controlling for unobserved borrower heterogeneity I also find that the intensity of the bank-borrower relationship and the initial firm age and size are important determinants of the extent of observed credit constraints. A Loan officer change leads to higher credit constraints, but the economic effect is relatively small (2.
7%). This confirms the reasoning in Berger and
Udell (2002) that not all of the soft information gathered by loan officers can be transformed into common knowledge within the Bank. An alternative explanation would be that the borrower and the loan officer were colluding leading to better loan terms than the borrower risk would justify. In this case, an increase in credit constraints after a loan officer change would imply a stricter, more objective assessment of the borrower's risk and repayment capacity by the new loan officer. Furthermore, I find confirmation for the earlier result that more transparent and less risky (Disposable income, Fixed capital loan) borrowers are less credit constrained. Not surprisingly, Leverage does not play any significant role in this fixed effects regression since it varies very little over time.
Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time
Employing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints that incorporates loan demand has confirmed the positive relation between close bank relationships and credit availability established by previous studies that use indirect or equilibrium outcome measures of credit constraints (e.g. Rajan (1994, 1995) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) ). The approach so far has crucially relied on the assumption that the observed requested and granted loan amounts mirror 'real' demand and supply. Yet, they may also be mere strategic indications arising from previous experience with the same contract partner and the loan negotiation process. Therefore, I take the analysis one step further and shed light on the movements of requested and granted loan amounts over borrowers' loan sequences. The structure of the dataset enables me to disentangle whether the observed reduction in credit constraints stems from the Bank's willingness to provide more funds to more transparent borrowers as is generally assumed in the literature. Alternatively or simultaneously, the borrower might learn over time what is reasonable to request from the Bank, which would also lead to a decrease of credit constraints over loan sequences.
12 Table 5 reports results for the determinants of requested and granted loan amounts with special focus on the influence of relationship measures and the dynamics that may drive the borrowers' and the Bank's decisions when contracting repeatedly.
Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for the determinants of Requested amount. The explanatory variable of particular interest in these regressions is Lag Requested-granted ratio
which indicates how constrained a borrower was at the previous loan. The estimates in column (1) reveal several interesting findings. The more credit constrained a borrower was at the previous loan, the lower the requested amount at the current loan. On average, a ten percent increase in loan size constraints at the previous loan decreases the requested amount at the current loan by 2.5%. Moreover, firms generally request larger loan amounts over the loan sequence (Times_3, …, Times_5). For instance, requested loan amounts for the third loan are by 16.6% higher than for the second loan. One reason may be that firms grow over time and therefore need to finance larger investments. This is supported by the positive relation between firm Age and the requested loan amount. Nevertheless, another explanation may be that especially the larger firms in the sample stay with the Bank for more interactions. I explicitly account for this possible drop-out problem in Table 6 by relating the number of loans a firm takes out to firm characteristics.
To assess how the relation between the number of interactions between a firm and the Bank (Times_3, ..., Times_5) and the Requested amount is moderated by the experience to be credit constrained at the previous loan I introduce the interaction terms of both variables in column (2). Figure 2 illustrates the results and shows that, in the beginning of the relationship, the increase in requested loan amounts is flatter for those borrowers that experienced high credit constraints in the past. Thus, while borrowers increase their loan requests over time they seem to learn from previous credit constraints how much to reasonably request from this Bank and adapt their requested loan amounts during the first few interactions accordingly.
This result is similar to the learning through negative feedback which Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2008) Turning to the determinants of the Bank's granted loan amounts, columns (3) and (4) reveal that all variables show the same signs as in the regressions for the firms' requested loan amounts with the interesting exception of the variable Lag Requested-granted ratio and its interactions with Times_3, ..., Times_5. The results in column (3) show that, in accordance with borrowers requesting larger loan amounts over time, the Bank also grants larger loan amounts over a loan sequence. For instance, granted loan amounts for the third loan are by 20.4% higher than for second loans. The more credit constrained a borrower was at the previous loan the more the Bank is willing to grant at the current loan but this effect is economically small. A ten percent increase in loan size constraints at the previous loan increases the granted amount at the current loan by 0.6% on average. Although this effect is not statistically significant in column (4), the significantly positive interaction terms Summarizing, being able to disentangle the dynamic patterns that arise when borrower and bank start a relationship and interact repeatedly reveals several interesting results. First, I
find that both requested and granted loan amounts increase considerably over time. Second, the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases especially in the beginning of the relationship due to a convergence of both sides with requested amounts increasing more moderately and granted amounts increasing more strongly when borrowers experience high vs. low previous credit constraints. And third, I observe the effects on the borrowers' side not to be driven by reduced firm growth of the credit constrained firms. These findings imply that borrowers react to the experience of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts by more moderate requests at their next loan application, thus avoiding being highly constrained again.
Therefore, they seem to learn from the feedback they get from previous experiences.
This learning process is possibly accompanied by the firms' entering into other bank relationships. Although the data does not include a direct measure of the number of banks a firm deals with, comparing information on firms' total liabilities and the amounts they receive at this Bank justifies the conclusion that a large fraction of firms has more than one source of credit, especially after the first few interactions with this Bank. Therefore, it may be unproblematic for many firms to adjust their requests at this Bank obtaining funds from other lenders at the same time. 13 Nevertheless, their repayment capacity should have increased over 13 I calculate an indicator for other bank relationships from the information I have and include it into the regressions specified in Table 5 . It is significantly and positively related to both requested and granted amount while the effects of all other variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Similarly, Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and time according to the increased granted loan amounts at this Bank because Bulgaria has had a public credit register during the whole observation period and a private credit bureau since 2005 from which the Bank can gather information on a borrower's various loans.
At the same time, the Bank seems to make use of initial loan size constraints to overcome information and incentive problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due repayment when contracting repeatedly (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005) and Martinelli (1997) ). This is in line with arguments that bank relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect and assess information in due course and benefit borrowers by better loan terms over time (see e.g. Boot (2000) for an overview).
Extensions
The previous analysis did not explicitly take into account that the number of loans a borrower stays with the Bank may depend on firm characteristics or previous experience with the Bank. Moreover, it did not deal with possible loan maturity constraints which may be prevalent besides loan size constraints. The following sections report results from extensions to the previous regressions accounting for these two issues.
Sample attrition
In the dataset, there is substantial attrition meaning that borrowers do not return to the Bank for another loan after repaying the current one or, at least, wait relatively long to take out another loan so that I cannot observe their coming back. It is plausible to assume that this process is not random but depends on borrower characteristics (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2010) ). On the one hand, borrowers may not come back to the Bank for another loan because they have generated enough internal revenues to finance future projects.
Alternatively, borrowers may turn to another bank because they were highly credit constrained at this Bank or because other banks offer lower interest rates. Furthermore, borrowers may follow their loan officers to other banks because they feel that the relationship is more with the loan officer than with the bank as a whole. On the other hand, the Bank may have reasons to deny another loan to borrowers who have defaulted on their previous loan or whose repayment behavior has been inadequate. The Bank may not extend another loan if the firm's financial situation has deteriorated or if the firm has proven not to be viable. Srinivasan (2010) find for their sample of large firms that borrowing from a prior lender leads to better granted loan terms even if borrowers have multiple sources of external financing.
Unfortunately, I can neither directly observe a borrower's decision whether to ask for another loan nor the Bank's decision to deny a loan application. However, the dataset's information on previous credit constraints, loan officer changes, firm and loan characteristics as well as borrowers' repayment behavior based on arrears allows me to deal with the attrition problem nevertheless. To account for the attrition process I follow the approach in Wooldridge (1995) . 14 Firstly, I estimate probit regressions for each period (loan number) to obtain the probability of observing loan k based on the credit constraint and the firm and loan characteristics for loan k-1 as well as the borrower's risk category (four categories depending on the days of arrears) at the time of repayment of loan k-1. Apart from that, I include two dummy variables indicating whether loan k-1 is an add-on loan which should decrease the probability to take out even another loan and whether it is a short-term loan which should increase the probability of a further loan. Interestingly, the extent of previous credit constraints does not seem to have a major impact on the decision to apply for a further loan.
The other explanatory variables display the signs as expected by the above reasoning.
Secondly, I calculate the respective inverse Mills ratios from these regressions and include them in the fixed effects regressions for the Requested amount and the Granted amount. A test of attrition bias is then a Wald test of the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios being jointly equal to zero. Since the second-stage regressions include the inverse Mills ratios as additional regressors which depend on the first-stage probit parameter estimates I bootstrap the standard errors performing 400 replications to derive their correct values.
[Insert Table 6 here] Table 6 reports the estimates for the determinants of Requested amount in columns (1) and (2) and of Granted amount in columns (3) and (4) after correcting for a possible attrition bias. The significant Chi²-statistics in all columns show that the null hypothesis of all Mills ratios being jointly zero can be rejected implying that there is attrition bias in the data.
Nevertheless, all results from the basic regressions in Table 5 are qualitatively confirmed even after controlling for the attrition bias while the bootstrapped standard errors are somewhat larger than those adjusted for clustering at the firm level in Table 5 .
Loan maturity constraints
The importance of the loan maturity as a monitoring device and in dealing with borrower risk has been established by theoretical (e.g. Flannery (1986) , Diamond (1991) and Diamond (2004)) as well as empirical papers (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) ,
Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2008), Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) and Kirschenmann and Norden (2010) ). The descriptive statistics in Table 3 suggest that amount and maturity are complementary loan terms for the majority of loans. The following analysis therefore concentrates on those loans for which the Bank only adjusts one of the two loan terms to assess whether and in which cases the Bank uses maturity constraints rather than loan size constraints to deal with borrower risk and agency problems. Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the two groups of loans for which the Bank either adjusted maturity or amount.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Columns (1) and (2) include loans for which the granted amount equals the requested amount. These loans were either granted with a shorter than requested maturity (column (1)) or a longer than requested maturity (column (2)). They show that loans with a shorter than requested maturity carry comparatively small amounts but were requested with relatively long maturities. The asymmetric information indicators display that they are loans made early in a relationship. Interestingly, the firm characteristics, especially size (Assets) and repayment capacity (Disposable income), do not differ considerably for the two groups. In contrast,
columns (3) and (4) show that the adjustment of the loan size crucially depends on firm characteristics and the extent of asymmetric information in the beginning of the relationship (Initially young, Initially small). This is in line with the results from the previous regression analysis. I conclude from these findings that the incidence of receiving a shorter than requested maturity mainly occurs if borrowers apply for a maturity that is obviously too long in comparison to their requested (and granted) amount. As this seems to mostly happen in early stages of the relationship, it is another indication for learning at the borrower side.
In a next step, I assess the determinants of maturity constraints more formally. 15 I reestimate the regressions displayed in Table 4 with the dependent variable now being the ratio of requested to granted loan maturity. I restrict the estimation sample to those loans for which requested amount equals granted amount to assess whether the Bank uses maturity constraints instead. Except for the Time dummies the economic relevance of all explanatory variables is 15 Detailed regression results are available from the author upon request.
very small. Furthermore, Initially Young, Initially small and their interaction terms with the Times dummies are insignificant which confirms the descriptive findings in Table 7 .
Finally, I re-estimate all specifications displayed in Tables 4 and 5 Analyzing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints which incorporates requested loan amounts shows that such observed credit constraints decrease significantly over loan sequences with this effect being particularly pronounced for firms that are comparatively young or small when starting to borrow from the Bank. Loan officer changes lead to higher observed credit constraints, which seems to be driven rather by the loss of private information than by a possible collusion between borrowers and their long-time loan officers. Finally, more transparent and less risky firms are less credit constrained.
Taking the analysis one step further and studying the dynamics behind the observed reduction of credit constraints over a bank-borrower relationship I find that both requested and granted loan amounts increase over time. Interestingly, the results suggest that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases in the beginning of the relationship because both sides converge. When previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately and granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of small previous constraints. The Bank seems to make use of dynamic incentives to overcome information and agency problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due repayment when contracting repeatedly. While the Bank increases granted loan amounts when learning about borrowers' risk and repayment behavior, borrowers seem to learn from the (negative) feedback they get from previous experiences with credit constraints at the Bank.
One question that arises concerns the transferability of these results to other environments. On the one hand, concentrating the analysis on small loans from one bank in an emerging market provides an ideal ground for studying the influence of bank relationships on requested and granted loan terms because informational asymmetries are presumably severe.
Furthermore, the loan granting process is the same for all observed loans reducing possible heterogeneity at this level. On the other hand, the bank and its loan contracts that are standardized with respect to interest rates and collateral requirements may seem special.
Nevertheless, it provides a natural setting that allows gaining insights into the dynamics of requested and granted loan amounts in multiple interactions between borrowers and banks.
Moreover, standardizing interest rates is not uncommon in other loan categories like mortgage loans or overdrafts. Finally, my empirical procedure is applicable in many other lending contexts and should thereby contribute to a better understanding of the processes behind observed loan contracting outcomes.
The dynamic patterns found in this study complement and connect key elements of the literatures on relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending and credit availability of small firms. However, the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts which I denote as observed credit constraints may as well be a measure of borrower bargaining power or capture the borrower's financial literacy. Disentangling these various aspects with more comprehensive data (e.g. on borrowers' different sources of credit -in markets with and without information sharing among lenders) and gaining deeper insights into the dynamics of bank and borrower behavior in bank lending seems to be a fruitful area of future research. (1) and (2) and Granted amount which is the granted loan amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 . ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05-and 0.1-level.
(1) (1) and (2) and Granted amount which is the granted loan amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 . ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05-and 0.1-level.
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Figure 1. The Requested-granted ratio by loan sequence
This figure displays the evolution of the Requested-granted ratio, the indicator for the extent of observed credit constraints, over the loan sequence for the full sample and different subsamples based on the asymmetric information indicators. Initially young (old) firms have a firm age below or equal to (above) two years when first borrowing from the Bank. Initially small (large) firms are of firm size below (equal to or above) the median firm size based on total assets when first borrowing from the Bank. 
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Figure 3. Granted loan amounts and the extent of previous credit constraints
This figure displays the effect of high vs. low previous credit constraints (Lag Requested-granted ratio) on the relation between Granted amount and the Times dummies. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. High (low) in the figure refers to values that are one standard deviation above (below) the mean of Lag Requestedgranted ratio. 
